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Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) 
technologies will shape societies by the values they are 
programmed to respect. In part because of anti-competitive 
Chinese practices such as forced transfers of intellectual 
property (IP), companies based in the U.S. have lost the 
ability to compete in several fields. To avoid losing 
competitiveness in AI/ML sectors, the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) should promulgate 
rules blocking Chinese investors from acquiring ownership 
interests in U.S. companies when that ownership would 
allow access to material nonpublic technical knowledge of 
AI/ML. Such a categorical blacklist approach will limit 
forced transfers of IP and increase the influence of American 
values on the development of AI/ML technology. 
 
 “Until recently, the internet in almost every country outside China 
has been defined by American platforms with strong free 
expression values. There’s no guarantee these values will win out. 
A decade ago, almost all of the major internet platforms were 




In January 2020, the Department of the Interior announced that it 
had grounded its entire drone fleet.2 Though these drones made more than 
10,000 flights in 2018 to help monitor endangered species and survey 
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1 Mark Zuckerberg Stands for Voice and Free Expression, FACEBOOK (Oct. 17, 
2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/mark-zuckerberg-stands-for-voice-
and-free-expression/ (“We can continue to stand for free expression, 
understanding its messiness, but believing that the long journey towards greater 
progress requires confronting ideas that challenge us. Or we can decide the cost 
is simply too great. I’m here today because I believe we must continue to stand 
for free expression”). 
2 Lisa Friedman & David McCabe, Interior Dept. Grounds Its Drones Over 
Chinese Spying Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/01/29/technology/interior-chinese-drones.html. 
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federal land (among other uses),3 the department grounded the fleet over 
concerns that the drones’ Chinese manufacturers might have backdoors or 
data collection functions which enable cyber espionage.4 The Department 
had purchased Chinese-manufactured drones mainly because they are 
recognized as the best in the industry: Chinese-owned companies control 
more than eighty percent of the market for small unmanned aerial 
vehicles.5 Pentagon officials have since remarked on the need for U.S. 
manufacturers to regain parity with their Chinese counterparts to ensure a 
“safe and secure supply” of domestically manufactured drones.6 
Drones are but one technology with a supply chain that has 
national security implications for all countries. Acknowledging this, China 
promulgated the Made in China 2025 (“MIC 2025”) strategic initiative, 
aiming to secure market share in ten industries.7 These industries include 
next-generation information technology, robotics, aerospace and aviation 
equipment, and new energy vehicles, among others.8 The Chinese 
government subsidizes companies in these fields when they achieve 
certain goals such as localizing intellectual property (IP).9 
China’s goal of localizing IP has implications for the U.S. and its 
allies in part because of the way China uses foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to accomplish this goal.10 The Chinese government frequently 
invests in foreign companies with substantial IP assets,11 either directly or 
through a state-owned enterprise (SOE). This investment gives the 
government access to proprietary information and technical know-how, 
which it may then transfer to all Chinese companies. An example of a 
“forced IP transfer,” this process gives a competitive advantage to Chinese 
producers relative to their U.S.-based counterparts because the profit 
motive that would drive protection of IP assets does not apply to SOEs. 
China has begun to use this ability to distort the market to its strategic 
advantage. 
American responses to forced IP transfers have ramped up. In 
2018, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) issued a two-tiered list of 
 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) PROGRAM 
2018 USE REP. 4 (2019). 
4 Friedman & McCabe, supra note 2. 
5 Lukas Schroth, Drone Manufacturer Market Shares: DJI Leads the Way in the 
US, DRONE INDUSTRY INSIGHTS (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.droneii.com/ 
drone-manufacturer-market-shares-dji-leads-the-way-in-the-us. 
6 Transcript, Ellen M. Lord, Undersecretary of Defense Lord Holds Press Briefing 
on Acquisition Reform and Innovation (Aug. 26, 2019), 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1944326/un
dersecretary-of-defense-lord-holds-press-briefing-on-acquisition-reform-and-i/. 
7 WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10964, THE MADE IN CHINA 
2025 INITIATIVE: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 2 (2019). 
8 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL AMBITIONS BUILT 
ON LOCAL PROTECTIONS 10 (2017), https://www.uschamber.com/sites 
/default/files/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf. 
9 Id. at 48. 
10 See MORRISON, supra note 7. 
11 Id. 
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products on which it would apply a twenty-five percent tariff.12 The list 
targeted products benefitting from the above-described forced transfers of 
IP.13 Additionally, Congress enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act |(FIRRMA), which gave more authority to the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to block 
certain investments by foreign entities.  
Building on these policy reactions, CFIUS should promulgate 
rules blocking Chinese investors from acquiring ownership interests in 
U.S. companies when that ownership would allow access to material 
nonpublic technical knowledge14 in artificial intelligence (AI) and 
machine learning (ML). While this would limit the short-run availability 
of FDI, failing to address the issue of forced technology transfers may 
place the U.S. at a permanent technological disadvantage. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. AI and National Security 
Failing to maintain parity in ML technologies with other nations 
would be detrimental to U.S. national security. A simple scenario, feasible 
with existing technology,15 illustrates why: an unidentified group creates 
several hundred “deepfakes”⁠—that is, fake video and audio⁠—which 
feature Presidential candidates from both political parties making 
disturbing statements. Social distrust would spread as voters debate 
whether the videos are real, potentially destabilizing the election cycle or 
increasing volatility in financial markets. A variety of other more direct 
military applications of ML technologies are possible, such as 
impersonating military leadership via natural language processing,16 
pattern recognition which speeds review of intelligence,17 and use of ML-
driven tools in cyber operations.18 Further, commentators have widely 
noted the lack of a civilian-military distinction within the country.19 Non-




14 See 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (a)(4)(D)(i)(1). 
15 See John Feffer, Will a ‘Deepfake’ Swing the 2020 Election?, FOREIGN POL’Y 
FOCUS (Jun. 19, 2019), https://ips-dc.org/deepfake-swing-2020-election/. 
16 2018 PUBLIC-PRIVATE ANALYTIC EXCHANGE PROGRAM, AI: Using Standards 
to Mitigate Risks 12 (2018), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/PE/Documents/2018_AEP-AI.pdf. 
17 Id. at 13. 
18 See Greg Allen & Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security 
18 (Jul. 2017), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-
and-national-security (quoting Adm. Mike Rogers, director of the National 
Security Agency, who suggests that “Artificial Intelligence and machine 
learning . . . is foundational to the future of cybersecurity”). 
19 Andrew P. Hunter et al., Artificial Intelligence and National Security: The 
Importance of the AI Ecosystem, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. 49 
(2018),https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/181102 
_AI_interior.pdf. 
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Maintaining AI/ML parity may result in solutions to these threats. 
Automated deepfake detection technology already exists,20 with major 
companies releasing training datasets of deepfaked videos to help improve 
detection.21 More importantly, technological parity would ensure that the 
technology is at least partially shaped by American interests in freedom of 
expression and privacy rather than by those with interests in maximizing 
surveillance and control.22 
 AI/ML parity is no guarantee, however, given China’s centrally 
directed efforts and investments made in its pursuit of MIC 2025. China is 
actively investing in U.S.-based companies with “militarily relevant” ML 
technical knowledge.23 From 2010-2017, Chinese-based investors ramped 
up investment in emerging technologies, participating in $1.3 billion 
investments in the field over that time and accounting for 29 percent of 
Chinese FDI in 2017.24  IP owned by U.S.-based companies with Chinese 
investors is at risk of being forcibly transferred. In 2017, the Chinese 
Cybersecurity Law became effective, requiring certain companies doing 
business in China to keep certain data on local Chinese-based servers25 and 
allow certain government officials full access.26 This law has raised 
concerns that firms could be asked to provide source code or other IP to 
the Chinese government,27 which would allow the code to be illicitly 
shared with state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
B. AI/ML as Uniquely Critical Technologies 
It is becoming popular to suggest that AI is mostly a buzzword 
and is not a big deal.28 Given the failure of other technological buzzwords 
 
20 David Guera & Edward J. Delp, Deepfake Video Detection Using Recurrent 
Neural Networks, Video and Image Processing Laboratory at Purdue University 
(2018), https://engineering.purdue.edu/~dgueraco/content/deepfake.pdf. 
21 Alex Engler, Fighting Deepfakes When Detection Fails, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/fighting-
deepfakes-when-detection-fails/. 
22 See KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45178, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 22 (2019) (“Some experts believe that 
China’s intent to be the first to develop military AI applications may result in 
comparatively less safe applications as China will likely be more risk-acceptant 
throughout the development process.”). 
23 Id. at 21. 
24 Michael Brown & Pavneet Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy, DEF. 
INNOVATION UNIT EXPERIMENTAL 7 (2018), https://admin.govexec.com/media 
/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf.  
25 Wangluoanquan Fa Quan (网络安全法全) [Cyber Security Law] (promulgated 
by the Nat’l People’s Cong, Nov. 7, 2016, effective Jun. 1, 2017), art. 37. 
26 Wangluoanquan Fa Quan (网络安全法全) [Cyber Security Law] (promulgated 
by the Nat’l People’s Cong, Nov. 7, 2016, effective Jun. 1, 2017), art. 28. 
27 See Jack Wagner, China’s Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Jun. 1, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-
law-what-you-need-to-know/ (“The law has raised concerns among some foreign 
companies over greater data controls as well as increased risks of intellectual 
property theft.”). 
28 See, e.g., Eric Siegel, Why A.I. is a Big Fat Lie, BIGTHINK (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://bigthink.com/technology-innovation/why-a-i-is-a-big-fat-lie. 
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to impress—like blockchain29—this makes some sense. AI provides ways 
of doing things better and more quickly, but it does not seem to 
fundamentally revolutionize the tasks to which it has been applied. 
But AI will improve. It is not a bold prediction to say that in 
twenty years, AI will be able to fundamentally revolutionize more tasks, 
and it will shape those tasks in ways that imbue certain values. 
Surveillance cameras with built in ML-driven facial recognition 
technology, for example, seem creepy to some but normal to others. How 
society chooses to implement technology will define norms for future 
generations.  
Moreover, AI is particularly prone to monopolies. AI is driven by 
data and data processing. Sorting data into a useful format is frequently 
difficult, at least for the moment. Moreover, even if we should conquer 
that problem, the primary barrier to improving AI algorithms is the time it 
takes to train a model on such a large amount of data. Especially when AI 
can experiment (such as with human users by showing them different 
recommendations and incorporating those reactions into the model),30 
organizations that have been around for longer and have more data will 
usually have the upper hand against market entrants. Thus, should China 
or the U.S. gain a strategic advantage against the other, it may prove 
difficult for one to dislodge the other. 
II. EXISTING LAW 
CFIUS may suspend transactions, mergers, or joint ventures 
resulting in a foreign person having control over any U.S. business if the 
transaction would pose a risk to national security.31 At CFIUS’s 
recommendation, the President may then block the transaction 
permanently.32 “Covered transactions” are generally outlined by statute, 
and include those resulting in a foreign person having access to “material 
nonpublic information,”33 or have involvement in substantive decision-
making of U.S. businesses regarding critical infrastructure34 and critical 
technologies,35 or control over a business which has certain sensitive 
personal data about U.S. citizens.36 Transactions of certain real estate may 
also be covered.37  
CFIUS may review transactions sua sponte38 or because a party to 
the transaction formally notifies CFIUS in advance and seeks specific 
 
29 See, e.g., Ben Dickson, Are We in a Blockchain Winter?, PCMAG (Apr. 6, 
2019), https://www.pcmag.com/commentary/367612/are-we-in-a-blockchain-
winter. 
30 See CGP Grey, How Machines Learn, YOUTUBE (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9OHn5ZF4Uo. 
31 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(1). 
32 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1). 
33 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(i)(I). 
34 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(i)(III)(bb). 
35 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(i)(III)(cc). 
36 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(i)(III)(aa). 
37 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(C). 
38 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(D) . 
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approval.39 Once CFIUS approves a transaction for which approval was 
specifically sought, it may not be re-reviewed.40  
The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
(FIRRMA) in 2018 substantially expanded CFIUS’s authority in 
important ways.41 Major changes included allowing the Committee to treat 
investors from specified countries differently,42 allowing it to promulgate 
rules requiring mandatory filing for certain transactions,43 and broadening 
the scope of the Committee’s purview to include certain real estate and 
personally identifiable data relating to U.S. citizens.44 FIRRMA also 
provided for a $20 million expansion of CFIUS’s appropriation, 
presumably to handle its newly-delegated authority and prominence as a 
newfound centerpiece of national security law.45 
A. Legislative History 
Established in 1975 pursuant to an Executive Order, President 
Ford created CFIUS to address concerns that certain investments by OPEC 
members were politically rather than economically motivated.46 The Order 
focused on data collection and descriptive analysis and did not provide the 
power to impede foreign investment.47 
In response to concerns that the President lacked authority to 
collect this sort of data absent legislative mandate, Congress passed the 
International Investment Survey Act of 1976 to give the President the 
“‘clear and unambiguous authority’ to collect information on 
‘international investment.’”48 
It was not until the 1988 “Exon-Florio” amendment to the Defense 
Production Act that Congress delegated to the President the authority to 
block certain acquisitions of U.S. businesses.49 The President could only 
exercise that authority, however, if “(1) other U.S. laws were inadequate 
or inappropriate to protect the national security and (2) ‘credible evidence’ 
existed that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that 
threatened to impair U.S. national security.”50  
The most dramatic change in CFIUS’s statutory authority came 
with the passage of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 
2007 (FINSA), which, among other changes, drastically broadened the 
number of transactions covered by adding to the list of factors which 
 
39 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C). 
40 31 C.F.R. § 800.601 (2019). 
41 See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R33388, THE COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 2 (Feb. 14, 2020). 
42 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(E). 
43 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. 
L. 115–232 § 1706, 132 Stat. 1636, 2184 (2018). 
44 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(C). 
45 See JACKSON, supra note 41, at 12. 
46 Id. at 4. 
47 Id. at 5–6. 
48 Id. at 6. 
49 Id. at 7. 
50 Id. 
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CFIUS could use to determine if a transaction impaired national security.51 
New factors added by the 2007 law included effects on “critical 
infrastructure” or “critical technologies,” as well as “such other factors as 
the President or the Committee determine to be appropriate.”52 FINSA also 
created measures intended to boost transparency and reporting to 
Congress.53 
 Congress enacted the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) 
along with FIRRMA. The ECRA places export controls on products which 
are identified as “foundational and emerging technologies” and “essential 
to the national security of the United States.”54 Acquisitions of businesses 
with products subject to controls under this provision of the ECRA are 
then incorporated by reference as “critical technologies” subject to CFIUS 
review.55 While existing export control provisions cover software like 
encryption tools,56 there is no general limitation on the export of AI/ML 
algorithms.  
B. Final Rules 
In September 2019, Treasury proposed permanent rules to replace 
the pilot program.57 These rules became effective in February 2020. 
Most relevant to this note’s proposal is the rules’ creation of an 
investor whitelist. FIRRMA required the Committee to define what a 
“foreign person” means and to “limit the application of such clauses to the 
investments of certain categories of foreign persons.”58 When the rules 
were initially proposed, they did not specify exempted countries.59 Rather, 
they left the list to a vote of CFIUS members.60  
The House Financial Services Committee criticized this decision. 
In their October 2019 letter, the House Committee’s leadership wrote to 
express their desire that “many U.S. allies, including NATO and non-
NATO partners, should remain unaffected by FIRRMA's expansion,” and 
 
51 JACKSON, supra note 41, at 10. 
52 50 U.S.C. § 4565(f)(11). If this seems overbroad to the point of making the 
other factors redundant, that’s because it is overbroad. To borrow a phrase from a 
commentator, “[t]he Committee's legal mandate is replete with discretion.” David 
Zaring, CFIUS as Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 84 
(2009). FINSA’s broadening of the scope of transactions covered by CFIUS is a 
possible legislative reaction to CFIUS’s failure to intervene in a purchase of six 
U.S. ports by Dubai Ports World in 2006. See JACKSON, supra note 41, at 4. 
53 See JACKSON, supra note 41, at 10. 
54 50 U.S.C. § 4817(a). 
55 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(6)(A)(vi). 
56 15 C.F.R. § 742.15. 
57 Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign 
Persons, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,174 (Sep. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Notice] (to be codified 
at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800). 
58 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(E). 
59 Notice, supra note 57, at 50,179. 
60 Id. 
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urged the Committee to establish a list as soon as possible.61 In response, 
the Committee has “initially selected” Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom as excepted foreign states,62 implying that more additions may 
be made.  
Comments submitted on the proposed rules argued that the 
mandatory filing requirements were onerous and made investors more 
hesitant63 and businesses more inclined to exclude foreign investors when 
possible.64 The comments argued that this burden would be particularly 
heavy in fields like biotechnology and venture capital, where deals and 
technology move very quickly.65  
Direct impacts on Chinese FDI are already becoming clear. 
Chinese venture investment declined in the U.S. during the first half of 
2019, about 27 percent over the preceding two quarters.66 However, some 
commentators have noted that “CFIUS appears ill-equipped to police the 
venture-capital industry,”67 raising questions about compliance rates in 
industries related to AI and ML technologies. 
There is a clear desire among stakeholders for categorical rules 
and regulatory certainty. Of all the submissions during the public comment 
period,68 by far the most common request was for the Committee to act 
quickly to add their preferred country to the whitelist.69 Others did not 
explicitly request a country to be added to the whitelist, but rather 
requested published criteria so they could understand what guidelines 
 
61 H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVICES, HOUSE LETTER TO SECRETARY MNUCHIN ON 
FIRRMA DRAFT RULES 2 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov 
/document?D=TREAS-DO-2019-0008-0065. 
62 Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign 
Persons, 85 Fed. Reg. 3,112, 3,116 (Jan. 17, 2020) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 
800). 
63 See, e.g., SHEARMAN & STERLING, Comment on Proposed Rule NPRM Part 800 
– Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign 
Persons 2 (Oct. 17, 2019), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=TREAS-
DO-2019-0008-0054 (noting the proposed rule creates “a strong incentive for 
Japanese companies to exclude non-Japanese nationals from a non-excepted 
foreign state in order to avoid a mandatory CFIUS filing”). 
64 Id. 
65 See Genentech, Inc., Comments on the Proposed Provisions Pertaining to 
Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons 3 (Oct. 16, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=TREAS-DO-2019-0008-0051. 
66 Heather Somerville, China Investors Keep Making Deals in Silicon Valley Amid 




68 Your author has read all of them. The volume of well-drafted and almost 
certainly well-compensated comments makes clear the need for disinterested 
commentary on the subject. 
69 See, e.g., SHEARMAN & STERLING, supra note 63. 
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needed to be met to be on the whitelist.70 This reflects a larger desire for 
transparency which partly motivates this paper’s proposal. 
C. Ralls and Other Limitations on Authority of CFIUS 
Some commentators note that the law covers “potentially tens of 
thousands [of transactions] each year.”71 But “[w]hile CFIUS’s reach is 
broad, it is not infinite.”72 What limitations exist?  
The constitution provides some constraint, explored for the first 
and only time by a court in Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States.73 Ralls was a U.S.-based company owned 
by two Chinese nationals. In 2012, Ralls purchased four companies with 
assets allowing development of wind farms in Oregon within restricted 
airspace and near a bombing zone maintained by the U.S. Navy.74 Ralls 
then notified the Committee of the acquisition and responded to several 
questions but was never informed of the significance of CFIUS’s 
inquiries.75 In the following months, the Committee ordered Ralls to 
suspend the wind farm’s development and conducted an investigation.76 
After the investigation and finding that Ralls “might take action that 
threatens to impair the national security of the United States,” the 
President issued a divestment order which required Ralls to sell its interest 
in the wind farms.77 
Ralls contended that, under the Due Process Clause,78 it was 
entitled to know the grounds on which CFIUS made its decision and be 
given the opportunity to present its side to the Committee. A three-judge 
panel of the D.C. Circuit agreed: its 2014 opinion held that “due process 
requires, at the least, that an affected party be informed of the official 
action, be given access to the unclassified evidence on which the official 
actor relied and be afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence.”79  
Ralls has come under fire from multiple sides. Some argue that it 
requires the executive to surrender information that should properly be 
 
70 See, e.g., Nancy McLernon, Comments on Provisions Pertaining to Certain 
Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,174 and 
Provisions Pertaining to Certain Transactions by Foreign Persons Involving Real 
Estate in the United States, 84 FR 50214, ORG. FOR INT’L INVESTMENT 2 (Oct. 
17, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=TREAS-DO-2019-0008-
0048. 
71 Farhad Jalinous et al., CFIUS Reform Becomes Law: What FIRRMA Means for 
Industry, WHITE & CASE 2 (2018), https://www.whitecase.com 
/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/cfius-reform-becomes-law-
what-firrma-means-for-industry.pdf. 
72 U.S. Export Controls and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) 
(statement of Hon. Marco Mancuso, Senior Visiting Fellow, Hudson Institute). 
73 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
74 Id. at 304. 
75 Id. at 305. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 306. 
78 Ralls Corp. 758 F.3d, at 306. 
79 Id. at 319. 
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subject to executive privilege and part of the executive’s inherent authority 
to maintain international relations.80 Other commentators suggest that 
Ralls does not do enough to protect property interests.81 
The other major limitation on CFIUS’s authority over covered 
transactions is its own rules. As one commentator remarks, “[t]he 
negotiated solution [to CFIUS’s expansive authority] appears to be 
deferring to CFIUS to ‘prescribe regulations’ . . . .”82 
III. CREATING CATEGORICAL RULES PROHIBITING CERTAIN 
INVESTMENT 
A. Proposal 
CFIUS should adopt rules that block Chinese investors from 
acquiring ownership interests in U.S. companies if that ownership would 
allow access to material nonpublic technical knowledge in AI/ML. This 
approach is a categorical blacklist, as opposed to the individualized, ad 
hoc assessments in current practice.  
B. Statutory Authorization for the Proposal 
CFIUS has statutory authority to implement a categorical 
prohibition like the one proposed. FIRRMA explicitly authorizes the 
Committee to single out an individual country for greater scrutiny,83 such 
as China in this proposal. In fact, in commenting on the existing proposed 
rules, a letter from the House Committee on Financial Services noted that 
“Treasury has opted for a so-called white list interpretation instead of a 
black list [sic],” but that “such an approach is not compulsory under 
FIRRMA.”84 Rather, the law merely requires Treasury to define what a 
“foreign person” means and to “limit the application of such clauses to the 
investments of certain categories of foreign persons,”85 which it has 
chosen to do through an as-yet-to-be-promulgated whitelist. This paper 
argues in favor of a blacklist approach. 
C. Categorical Rules and Ralls 
A categorical rule like the one offered here could be subject to 
challenge on the grounds that Ralls procedural due process86 requires an 
individualized assessment of each blocked transaction. 
 
80 See Christopher M. Fitzpatrick, Where Ralls Went Wrong: CFIUS, the Courts, 
and the Balance of Liberty and Security, 101 CORNELL L. Rᴇᴠ. 1087, 1111 (2016). 
81 See Yang Wang, Incorporating the Third Branch of Government Into U.S. 
National Security Review of Foreign Investment, 38 HOUS. J. INT’L L., 323, 345 
(2016). 
82 Jalinous, supra note 71, at 2. 
83 See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(E). The proposed rules currently under 
consideration do not use this authority to target any particular country. See 
CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS & JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
IF11334, CFIUS: NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW REGULATIONS 2 (2019). 
84 H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVICES, supra note 61. 
85 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(E). 
86 Ralls is the controlling precedent as challenges to CFIUS actions must be 
brought in the D.C. Circuit. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(2). 
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 Certain factors not present in Ralls would act in the government’s 
favor in a new case, however. The Ralls Court mentioned,87 and it has been 
widely noted in the literature,88 that the government in that case simply did 
not raise the issue of executive privilege until oral arguments at the 
appellate level.89 This oversight may have left a persuasive argument 
unexplored. Additionally, the enactment of FIRRMA four years after Ralls 
decidedly reaffirmed Congress’ intent to delegate substantial power to the 
Committee. Given the broad language of FIRRMA, it is difficult to 
imagine what actions might be beyond the power Congress intended to 
delegate. 
A strong analogy exists between the discretion given to CFIUS to 
identify national security risks and the President’s authority under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to declare 
emergencies. In the leading case on the subject, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
the Court was unbothered by the infringement on economic liberty by the 
President’s powers under IEEPA.90 
The Ralls court was able to distinguish Dames & Moore by noting 
that the transaction in Ralls had already been completed, and thus the 
property right had been fully vested.91 But a categorical rule like this 
proposal would bar future transactions, where property rights had not yet 
been vested. The critical distinction drawn by the Ralls Court would not 
be possible in a future review of this paper’s proposal. 
D. Discussion 
China has consolidated control of the majority of market share in 
many sectors, including drones,92 telecom equipment,93 surveillance 
cameras,94 and internet-of-things devices.95 These categories of devices 
have serious privacy and data security concerns.96 The Department of 
 
87 Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 320–21. 
88 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at 1109 (noting that “the precedent that the 
President set by releasing such a vast amount of information is problematic 
because it represents a surrender to the judiciary’s interference in the CFIUS 
process”). 
89 Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 319. 
90 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
91 See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 316 (noting that “Ralls's state-law property rights 
fully vested upon the completion of the transaction, meaning due process 
protections necessarily attached”). 
92 Schroth, supra note 5. 
93 John Chen et al., China’s Internet of Things, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND 
SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 1 (2008), https://www.uscc.gov/sites 
/default/files/Research/SOSi_China's%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf. 
94 Paul Mozur et al., Made in China, Exported to the World: The Surveillance 
State, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-police-government.html. 
95 Chen, supra note 93. 
96 See id. at 128 (noting that “[t]he Chinese government has given itself nearly 
unchecked legal powers to harness the data and supply chains of Chinese civilian 
firms for uses ranging from espionage to offensive operations” which “creates the 
potential for an unresolved critical tension between the commercial interests of 
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Defense is spending millions to reignite domestic innovation and 
manufacturing in these sectors, and these technologies are relatively 
straightforward to manufacture and design. Conversely, AI/ML 
technologies are particularly vulnerable to runaway leaders. Many AI/ML 
solutions interact with huge quantities of data and improve as they are 
used.97 This creates a kind of network effect that entrenches the front 
runner. If China pulls ahead, the U.S. may never catch up.98 
1. Economic Impacts. 
The benefits of FDI are well established and vital to the continued 
growth of the U.S. economy.99 Failing to “consistently attract sufficient 
(benign) FDI into the U.S. would present a long-term, systemic national 
security risk.”100 Beyond the macro effects, however, are the micro effects 
on individual businesses. Blocking all non-passive FDI in ML technology 
will almost certainly reduce short-run innovation. Some commentators 
have suggested that this might send technical expertise away from Silicon 
Valley and to China.101 
The premise of this note is, however, is that FDI is already driving 
the U.S. inexorably towards that end. FDI will merely ensure a future 
monopoly over high-end ML technology via forced technology transfers. 
That monopoly would have a chilling effect on innovation, as cheaper and 
better foreign products flood the U.S. market but with no way for U.S. 
companies to build on these products. This note’s proposal for a 
categorical rule would engender the creation and maintenance of a self-
sustaining cycle of innovation instead of allowing IP to be slowly siphoned 
away. 
Moreover, Chinese FDI accounts for a relatively limited portion 
of total investment stock. In 2017, FDI into the United States exceeded $4 
 
Chinese firms wishing to sell IoT products in the United States and the security 
and privacy of U.S. citizens”). 
97 See Matt Turck, The Power of Data Network Effects, MATTTURCK.COM (Jan. 4, 
2016), https://mattturck.com/the-power-of-data-network-effects/ (noting that “the 
more users use your product, the more data they contribute; the more data they 
contribute, the smarter your product becomes”).  
98 China already enjoys a substantial lead in data collection and availability due 
to lax privacy protections. See Natalie Sherman, Is China gaining an edge in 
artificial intelligence?, BBC (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/business-50255191 (“‘If the government decides that it's going to have 
country-wide electronic medical records . . . then it's going to happen.’” (quoting 
Tom Mitchell)). 
99 See John K. Mullen & Martin Williams, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Regional Economic Performance, 58 KYKLOS 265, 279 (2005) (“We find that 
inward foreign investment plays a strong, vital role in regional economic 
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100 Mancuso, supra note 72. 
101 See Justin Shields, Note, Smart Machines and Smarter Policy: Foreign 
Investment Regulation, National Security, and Technology Transfer in the Age 
of Artificial Intelligence, 51 J. MARSHALL L. Rᴇᴠ. 279, 298 (2018) (“U.S. 
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71                          Keeping Up With China                         [Vol. 19 
 
trillion.102 Of that amount, 84 percent was by European, Canadian, and 
Japanese investors,103 traditional allies which would likely be considered 
excepted countries under the Committee’s whitelist. 
As tensions have risen between the U.S. and China in recent years, 
commentators have begun to fear the “The Great Decoupling.”104 
Decoupling refers to the bifurcation of economies, social structures, and 
technological development in a way reminiscent of the Cold War.  
The decoupling has already begun; indeed, China and the U.S. 
have never been fully coupled. The Great Firewall, for example, has made 
American tech giants largely powerless to achieve the market dominance 
that they have seen elsewhere in the world.105 Social media networks, 
usually driven by network effects,106 are likewise powerless as China has 
walled itself off to promote its domestic alternatives.107  
While the transitionary period away from reliance on Chinese FDI 
may cause market headwinds, the U.S. should be able to mitigate the 
effects of decoupling and avoid isolating itself. It must reinvest in its allies. 
It could do so through a “multilateral regime under which firms subject to 
potential government influence in their corporate decision-making must 
demonstrate their ‘eligibility’ to engage in outbound M&A.”108 This could 
take the form of categorical rules providing for a whitelist, as in the 
Committee’s proposed rules.  
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(“Consequently, if it has a large market share, the social medium grows more 
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Russia have shown their willingness to limit access to social media. Your author 
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2. Transparency 
 Commentators have noted that “relatively little is known about 
CFIUS decision-making and the types of evidence that are used.”109 Much 
to the chagrin of the burgeoning crop of national security lawyers in large 
firms thriving on this uncertainty,110 a bright-line standard prohibiting all 
transactions of this type would turn an expansive and expensive regulation 
into a yes-or-no question for all but certain edge cases. This standard 
would reduce transaction costs dramatically and enable investors to make 
acquisitions more quickly, without having to wait for CFIUS approval or 
enduring the uncertainty of not requesting a review. 
A categorical approach like the one proposed here would also 
improve CFIUS’s credibility. CFIUS currently appears arbitrary: a survey 
of Chinese investors in 2016 found that 43 percent thought the CFIUS 
process was “politically charged.”111 Another 43 percent expressed lack of 
knowledge: only 13 percent expressed a positive view.112 
In 2010, CFIUS voted not to block a Russian acquisition of a 
uranium mining company, Uranium One.113 It was later revealed that the 
Clinton Foundation had received various donations from a several 
involved parties.114 As it turns out, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
was only tangentially involved, and the vote, which involved 
representatives from many agencies, was unanimous. 115 But those facts 
have not stopped the issue from being a recurring theme in national 
discourse years after the events.116 Categorical rules like the one proposed 
in this paper would provide regulatory certainty and limit the ground for 
Uranium One-style controversy. 
3. Ethical Development of AI/ML Technology. 
Some commentators have suggested that closing off the market 
would be tantamount to ceding U.S. authority.117 On the contrary, recent 
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experience shows that robust market demand will keep tech companies 
interested enough to change practices. The General Data Privacy 
Regulation (GDPR)⁠—which ostensibly applies only within the EU⁠—has 
forced changes by every major tech company worldwide.118 Instead of 
forcing a flight of tech companies from Europe, it has imposed 
quintessentially European perspectives on data privacy on monolithic tech 
firms.119 Limiting investment may create a similar greenhouse in the U.S. 
where it can exercise ethical leadership. As a Pentagon official noted in a 
recent press conference: 
It’s become circular — if you want to make sure that there are ethics 
principles that are attached to AI, you have to have the AI . . . . [I]f 
other people have the AI and you don't, then you're already in second 
place and you can't really do anything about making sure there are 
ethical principles involved.120 
CONCLUSION 
 AI/ML technologies will shape societies by the values they are 
programmed to respect. In part because of Chinese anti-competitive 
practices, the United States has lost the ability to compete in several fields, 
including commercial drones,121 surveillance cameras,122 and some 
telecom equipment.123 It would be disastrous if the U.S. lost parity with 
AI/ML technologies in the same way. 
CFIUS, as powerful as it has become, has intervened in only a 
handful of transactions124 despite its portrayal by detractors as 
“shadowy.”125 It has been cautious with its power. But when a clear threat 
arises, and Congress has delegated power to deal with that threat, a 
president and her officers must act. China is spending millions of dollars 
to secure American IP, and those investments drain long-term staying 
power from the U.S. economy in exchange for short term influxes of cash.  
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The president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, L. 
Rafael Reif, penned an editorial in the New York Times discussing the 
relative technological advantages of the U.S. and China.126 He writes: 
If all we do in response to China’s ambition is to try to double-lock 
all our doors, I believe we will lock ourselves into mediocrity. But if 
we in the United States respect China as a rising competitor with 
many strengths we can learn from, that view will inspire America to 
be its incomparable best.127 
Reif is right. The strength of the U.S. and its tech sector is not 
within the borders of the U.S. alone, but is in its position as a superpower 
leading liberal democracies across the globe. This paper’s proposal is not 
alone a solution. Rather, CFIUS should be one piece of a larger strategy.  
But it is a necessary piece. To preserve American competitiveness 
and ethical leadership128 in the next generation of technological 
advancement, CFIUS should take decisive and categorical action to defend 
American enterprise and abandon the piecemeal and cautious approach it 
has thus far employed. 
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